Conferences

Interviewers have a central place in collecting survey data. Yet, their role is often overlooked. This presentation proposes firstly to build on the “Agency theory” developed in economics to better understand how and to what extent interviewers have a potential impact on the quality of data. In economics, the principal-agent problem treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. Various mechanisms may be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, such as piece rates/commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, the agent posting a bond, or fear of firing. The principal-agent problem is found in most employer/employee relationships. Secondly, this presentation presents actual evaluation of the impact of interviewers on data collection. Besides a few general remarks coming from direct observation of interviewers (during interviews but also during briefings, debriefings and through discussion), variance in interviewers’ performance is assessed. We build on the possibility to bridge the results of four waves of the ESS, for France, where interviewers’ identification remains unaltered. This makes it possible to better analyse interviewers’ performance in terms of response rate, but also to measure the possible influence of interviewers on how people answer during the interview.